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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 002682

SIPDIS

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DTRA FOR OSA AND DIRECTOR  
NSC FOR LUTI  
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2015

TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON A  
DRAFT JCIC JOINT STATEMENT ON SS-25 ICBM FIRST STAGES  
BURNED WITHOUT NOZZLES ATTACHED; SS-25 ICBM ELIMINATION  
PROCEDURES IN VOTKINSK; KARTALY SITE DIAGRAM REDUCTION;  
U.S. PROPOSALS ON TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES; AND TRIDENT

SLBMS IN CONTAINERS, OCTOBER 31, 2005

REF: A. STATE 135913 (JCIC-DIP-05-012)  
[B](#). STATE 187747 (JCIC-DIP-05-017)  
[C](#). STATE 166556 (JCIC-DIP-05-014)  
[D](#). STATE 194955

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, U.S. Representative to  
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).  
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

- [1](#). (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-034.
- [2](#). (U) Meeting Date: October 31, 2005  
Time: 3:00 - 4:35 P.M.  
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY  
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[3](#). (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on October 31, 2005, to discuss a draft Joint Statement on confirming SS-25 ICBM first stages which had been burned (end domes burned out) without nozzles attached (REF A); SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures in Votkinsk; Russian-proposed reductions to the Kartaly Site Diagram; U.S. proposals for Trident RVOSI procedures (REF B); and inspections of Trident SLBMs in containers (REF C). All Parties were represented.

[4](#). (S) On the issue of confirming SS-25s with shortened first stages, the United States provided a U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) and suggested that the document be referred to the Conforming Working Group. With respect to Trident RVOSIs and Tridents in containers, the Russians stated they would provide the Russian response to the U.S. proposals later during the session. On reducing the Kartaly site diagram, the Russian Delegation stated that Russia had met all Treaty requirements to eliminate the facility, including sending a NRRC notification (REF D). The U.S. Delegation stated that the United States would study the Kartaly issue and respond at a later meeting. With respect to SS-25 ICBM eliminations, the Russian Federation restated its position that Russia was not required to eliminate the section of the missile which the United States had identified as being part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM). The U.S. Delegation said it would provide a detailed presentation at a later meeting.

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MAKING PROGRESS ON  
BURNED SS-25 STAGES  
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[5](#). (S) Boryak opened the first meeting of Part II of JCIC-XXVII. He said that, on the issue of confirming type of first stages of SS-25 missiles which were damaged due to being burned without nozzles, all Parties were in agreement that, due to the significant intersession work accomplished, this issue would hopefully come to resolution during this part of JCIC-XXVII. Taylor tabled a U.S.-Proposed JDT (text is in para 6 below) that had incorporated U.S. changes to Russia's proposed text. He explained that the section on confirming accuracy of the length measurement (6.5 meters) had been removed because confirmation had already taken place during the course of an elimination inspection. All Parties agreed to forward the JDT to the Conforming Working Group.

- [6](#). (S) Begin text (U.S.-Proposed JDT):  
Draft  
JCIC-XXVII  
U.S.-Proposed

Joint Draft Text  
October 31, 2005  
JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION  
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER (blank)

ON FIRST STAGES OF SS-25 ICBMs BURNED WITHOUT  
NOZZLES ATTACHED

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, during data update inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections, first stages without nozzles attached of SS-25 ICBMs, that have had their end domes burned out as a result of having had fuel removed by burning the stages without their nozzles attached, may be located at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the photographs of the first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, and declared data on the length of such a first stage, which were provided to the other Parties by the Russian Federation at JCIC-XXVII, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the 6.5 meter length of the first stage without nozzle attached of the SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, declared for such first stages, is the distance between the extreme points of the cylindrical portion of the motor case of that stage, without taking into account protruding elements attached to the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement, the Russian Federation will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration, in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length for the SS-25 ICBM in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

The Parties agree that the inspecting Party shall have the right during such inspections to confirm the type of ICBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of a first stage without nozzle attached of an SS-25 ICBM, in such configuration.

.... (Republic of Belarus)  
.... (Republic of Kazakhstan)  
.... (Russian Federation)  
.... (Ukraine)  
.... (United States of America)  
End text.

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NO PROGRESS ON SS-25  
ICBM ELIMINATIONS  
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17. (S) With respect to SS-25 elimination inspections at Votkinsk, Fedorchenko discussed the problems encountered during the first two elimination inspections. He also restated Russia's belief that 11 SS-25 ICBMs had been eliminated at Votkinsk. He noted that this was contrary to the U.S. view. The item, which the United States stated was part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM), is not part of the SCDM, has never been declared as part of the SCDM, and is not required to be eliminated. He indicated that the "compartment case" of the part of the missile that the United States believed was part of the SCDM was, in fact, part of the structure of the guidance and control devices, and cannot be dismantled without destruction of the devices. He requested that the United States respond by instructing its inspectors to confirm the elimination of SS-25 mobile ICBMs even if the guidance and control compartment is not eliminated. Taylor stated that the Russian position would be studied and the U.S. Delegation would provide a response at a later time.

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KARTALY REDUCED SITE  
DIAGRAM AND BASE CLOSE-OUT  
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18. (S) Fedorchenko led the discussion on reducing the boundary of the Kartaly Site Diagram. He stated that there were many changes to the facility since the first part of JCIC-XXVII. He said all silo launchers, including the silo training launcher, had been eliminated, and there was no more

equipment to support silo operations at the base. He stated that, under START, the site was considered to be eliminated as affirmed in the notification sent on October 21, 2005 (REF D) notifying the United States of that fact. He concluded by stating that the only inspection the United States may do from now until December 20, 2005 is a close-out inspection. Boryak provided a Russian-proposed S-Series Joint Statement on the reduction of the Kartaly Site Diagram. (Begin comment: The Russian Federation had previously provided a draft of a Joint S-Series document which significantly reduced the inspectable area of the site for the United States to review. End comment.) The Russian Federation proposed that the text be clarified by excluding references to inspections under paragraph 3 of Article XI and, instead, refer to inspections under paragraph 9 of Article XI. Taylor responded that the United States would study the issue and reply at a later meeting.

19. (S) Begin text (Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement):

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII  
Draft Proposed by the  
Russian Side  
October 31, 2005

Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission  
Joint Statement Number S-(blank)  
On Changes to the Boundary of the  
Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs

The Parties, referring to paragraph 19 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, taking into account the information with respect to the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs provided in Annex A to this Joint Statement, agree on the following:

(1) The new boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall be the boundary shown on the site diagram of this facility dated March 1, 2002, which is attached as Annex B to this Joint Statement.

(2) The site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, shall be used only for the inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of this Joint Statement.

(3) The portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded, pursuant to this Joint Statement, from within the boundary shown on the site diagram of this facility dated January 1, 1999, shall be subject to inspection using the appropriate procedures only during the inspection conducted at this facility under paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty. Subsequently, the portions to be excluded shall not be subject to inspection if they are not included (sic) within the boundary of any inspection site.

(4) The changes to the boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs shall become effective on the date specified in the notification provided by the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, or the date such notification is provided by the Russian Federation, or the date of entry into force of this Joint Statement, whichever is latest.

..... (United States of America)  
..... (Republic of Belarus)  
..... (Republic of Kazakhstan)  
..... (Russian Federation)  
..... (Ukraine)

Annex A

Information Provided by the Russian Federation  
on Changes to the Boundary of the  
Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs

The Russian Federation:

(1) pursuant to subparagraph 19(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, declares that the requirements set forth in the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the Treaty have been met with respect to the portions of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs to be excluded from within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the facility;

(2) pursuant to subparagraph 19(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, states that all structures that were ever shown within the boundary shown on the existing site diagram of the Kartaly ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs dated January 1, 1999, pursuant to subparagraph 9(b)(iii) or 9(b)(iv) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding and that will be excluded from within the boundary of this facility pursuant to this Joint Statement, are unchanged but will no longer be used for items of inspection as of March 1, 2002;

(3) beginning October 21, 2005, considers the above-mentioned facility to have been eliminated (No. RNC/STR 05-375/009 of October 21, 2005, gave notice thereof) and to be subject to inspection under paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(Begin comment: Attached to the Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement is a site diagram for the facility dated March 1, 2002. End comment.)

End text.

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TRIDENT RVOSI PROCEDURES  
NEARING RESOLUTION  
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110. (S) Taylor stated he was pleased to receive the Russian comments on the U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement on new Trident RVOSI procedures during the intersession. He noted the recent U.S. response to Russia's proposed changes and provided a copy of the U.S. proposal from REF A. He said that he viewed the issue as being very close to resolution and he looked forward to the other Parties' responses, hopefully early in the week, and hoped to move the draft Coordinated Plenary Statement to conforming as soon as possible. Boryak said that the Russian Delegation would respond to this issue later in the week. Shevtsov agreed with moving the draft coordinated plenary statement to the Conforming Working Group. Boryak stated that the Russians would be prepared to return to this later during the session.

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TRIDENTS IN CONTAINERS  
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111. (S) Taylor stated that the Trident in Containers issue was a long-standing one that he hoped to move to the Conforming Working Group as soon as possible. He provided the other Parties with the U.S. proposal from REF B. He referenced the Russian proposal, to open one container per Treaty year, and said that if this would resolve this issue the United States would incorporate it into current procedures. Boryak was pleased that the proposals were closer and noted that Russia had studied the U.S. position. He hoped to provide the Russian response as soon as possible, and stated that it may be appropriate to pursue this further in a working group meeting on November 2. Responding to a question from Fedorchenko, about the need to include Trident I SLBMs in containers in the U.S.-proposed policy documents, Mullins stated that there was the potential to see a Trident I SLBM in a container during Data Update Inspections, since the last submarine attributed with Trident I SLBMs was just unloaded. He stated that the United States was not prepared at this time to remove all Trident I references from the U.S.-Proposed Trident in Containers Policy Statement.

112. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed JDT for a Joint Statement on First Stages of SS-25 ICBMs Burned Without Nozzles Attached, dated October 31, 2005;

-- U.S.-Proposed Coordinated Plenary Statement for RVOSI for Trident II, dated October 11, 2005 (from DIP-017); and

-- U.S.-Proposed Statement of Policy for Inspections T-I and T-II, dated September 9, 2005 (from DIP-014).

- Russia:

-- Kartaly Site Diagram dated March 1, 2002, attached to October 31, 2005 Russian-Proposed S-Series Document; and

-- Russian-Proposed S-Series Joint Statement on Changes to the Boundary of the Kartaly ICBM Bases for Silo Launchers of ICBMs, dated October 31, 2005.

113. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor  
Mr. Mullins  
Mr. Buttrick  
Lt Col Diehl  
Mr. Dunn  
LCDR Feliciano  
Mr. Fortier  
Mr. Hay  
Mr. Johnston  
Ms. Kottmyer  
Mr. Kuehne  
Mr. Miller  
Maj Mitchner  
Col Rumohr  
Mr. Singer  
Col Smith  
Mr. Smith  
Mr. Vogel  
Dr. Zimmerman  
Lt Col Zoubek  
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich  
Kazakhstan

Mr. Baisuanov  
Russia  
Mr. Boryak  
Mr. Yegorov  
Gen Maj Artyukhin  
Col Fedorchenko  
Mr. Istratov  
Mr. Kamenskiy  
Mr. Kashirin  
Ms. Kotkova  
Amb Masterkov  
Mr. Mezhenyy  
Lt Col Novikov  
Col Osetrov  
Col Razumov  
Mr. Smirnov  
Ms. Sorokina  
Mr. Venevtsev  
Ms. Vodopolova  
Mr. Zaytsev  
Mr. Gusev (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov  
Mr. Dotsenko  
Mr. Fedotov  
Col Taran

14. (U) Taylor sends.  
Moley